Interview : Mickey Levy by Aaron Steelman
RF: How has your formal training in econom-
ics and your experience working in Washing-
ton, D.C., helped prepare you for a career on
Wall Street?
Levy: I try to apply sound, neoclassical econom-
ics to financial markets. Over time, the markets
tend to abide by economic fundamentals, and if
you stick to the fundamentals you will forecast
the market direction right more often than not
and avoid big mistakes. Many Wall Street econo-
mists seem to jump from theme to theme, which
can provide an unstable basis for analysis. 
My training in public policy also has helped.
For instance, having a sound understanding of
fiscal-policy research can be very useful in fore-
casting. I try to apply a combination of sound eco-
nomics and public-policy analysis to financial
market behavior.
RF: One area in which you have done a lot of
work—both as a policy economist and as a
business economist—is fiscal policy. How
would you assess the current situation, given
the increasingly large deficit projections
coming from the Congressional Budget Office
and other organizations?
Levy: Often, the size and structure of govern-
ment—and what they imply for resource alloca-
tion and private sector decisionmaking—take a
backseat to a narrow debate about the size of
deficits. We need to ask: What is the proper size
of government? What sort of activities should the
government fund? And what should be the proper
tax structure?
The emphasis on deficits also dominates the
fiscal-policy debate overseas. In the European
Union, fiscal policy is guided by the Growth and
Stability Pact that limits deficit-to-GDP ratios to
3 percent in member nations. Recently, I presented
a paper at a symposium sponsored by the Central
Bank of Austria in which I argued the Pact was a
poor guideline for conducting fiscal policy and rec-
ommended changes that would refocus the debate. 
Using a deficit-to-GDP ratio to evaluate and
coordinate fiscal policies across nations is mis-
guided. For instance, Germany and the United
States have comparable deficit-to-GDP ratios. But
Germany’s public spending amounts to nearly 50
percent of GDP, while the United States’ ratio is
about 20 percent at the federal level and about 35
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percent including state and local spend-
ing. The composition of government
spending varies across European nations,
and they have different tax structures.
So deficits often drive the debate, but
they are not a good reflection of fiscal
responsibility or thrust. Analogously,
consider an investment analyst prepar-
ing a financial report on a business. In
most cases, the company’s debt level pro-
vides insufficient information. Impor-
tantly, what is the company doing with
the capital? What is the rate of return
on the capital relative to its financing
costs? Deficits are important. But they
don’t tell you most of what you want to
know about fiscal policy.
I would revise Europe’s Growth and
Stability Pact by adding two new crite-
ria: caps on spending-to-GDP and taxes-
to-GDP that are well below their current ratios.
And to the extent that taxes are cut prior to
spending cuts, which would temporarily increase
deficits, the deficit criterion would be relaxed.
What would this accomplish? Research shows a
clear inverse relationship between government
spending and economic growth and also an inverse
relationship between taxes and economic growth.
On the other hand, the impact of deficits on eco-
nomic growth is ambiguous. These recommended
changes would force EU member nations to shift
their attention toward the true sources of their
problems in order to achieve greater economic
performance.
RF: How would you assess the performance of
the European Central Bank (ECB), now four and
a half years after the introduction of the euro?
Levy: My overall view is that the ECB has con-
ducted itself well in that it has steadfastly pursued
its mandate of price stability. It has clearly favored
rules over discretion in an extraordinarily difficult
environment in which it has tried to maintain low
inflation and establish credibility. By its very nature
as a supranational institution, though, it may be
destined to never earn the credibility it deserves
or desires because it will always be the fall guy for
Europe’s problems. Europe’s lackluster economic
performance, especially in the core of Europe, has
little to do with the ECB and much to do with the
excessive scope of government, anti-growth taxes, 
and burdensome regulatory policies.
I should note that some European nations
enjoy healthy growth. But they are not in the core
of the continent: France and Germany are strug-
gling, while Ireland is doing very well. And when
you compare the two groups, you see that sound
pro-growth economic policies are rewarded by
stronger economic performance while misguided
policies, though often well-intended, result in poor
economic performance. I don’t think Ireland and
other fast-growing countries in western Europe
will serve as a model for the struggling countries
of core Europe. That is asking too much. But as
new nations ascend into the EU, they will become
very attractive destinations for jobs, production
facilities, and capital from core Europe. Core
Europe’s policymakers will then respond to the
political pressure to reform.
RF: There is debate among economists about
the effects that budget deficits have on inter-
est rates. What is your view?
Levy: The empirical research does not give us an
unambiguous answer on the relationship between
budget deficits and interest rates. As an econo-
mist working on Wall Street who follows the
markets day to day, it is absolutely clear that inter-
est rates are driven primarily by economic per-































tell you most of
what you want 
to know about
fiscal policy.do, in fact, affect interest rates, their impact is
relatively minor. Just look at history. In recent
years, we have seen a dramatic shift from budget
surpluses to huge deficits, and interest rates have
fallen to 40-year lows. During sustained periods
of the 1990s, rates were rising as deficits were
falling sharply. It’s interesting how certain notions
persist among financial market participants and
the public even though they are not supported by
hard evidence. The idea that deficits strongly
affect interest rates is one case; another is the
Phillips Curve notion that there is a tradeoff
between unemployment and inflation.
RF: You have been analyzing Social Security
for more than 20 years. During that time, the
program’s fiscal problems have become
increasingly clear, inspiring many reform pro-
posals. How would you recommend reforming
the system? 
Levy: The unfunded lia-
bility for Social Security
overwhelms current cash-
flow deficits; this has not
changed. I think you need
to deal with this on several
fronts. First, you need to
remove disincentives to
work. The elimination of
the Social Security earn-
ings test, for instance, was
very favorable. Second,
you need to increase the
average age of retirement
in order to receive full
benefits. Third, I would
favor a partial and gradual
privatization of Social
Security with income sup-





have claimed that ordinary
people just aren’t smart enough to invest their own
money. I work for an organization with approxi-
mately 150,000 employees spread throughout the
United States with a wide variety of educational
and economic backgrounds. They seem to have
little difficulty with their retirement plans and
determining how to allocate their assets into
investment funds. Another claim made by oppo-
nents of privatization is that Wall Street favors
privatization because it would benefit at the hands
of workers. This is simply wrong. Wall Street is a
very competitive place, and the management fees
of the big mutual funds are below the adminis-
trative costs of the Social Security Administration.
When you cut through all the smoke, the real
issue is that opponents of privatization want Con-
gress to maintain the power of the purse, and they
don’t want that power reallocated to private
households. This theme of who controls national
resources is a common theme in the debate about
a number of fiscal issues. 
RF: Does deflation pose problems for mone-
tary policy that are substantively different
from those associated with fighting inflation?
Levy: Let me say at the outset that I don’t see
destabilizing deflation as a major threat and I
think the Federal Reserve has overstated the
concern about it. Currently, I think three ques-
tions about deflation are relevant. First, under
what conditions would it occur? Second, would it
be destabilizing? Third, if it occurred, could you
get out of it? 
In my mind, just as inflation occurs when you
have excess demand relative to productive capac-
ity, deflation occurs when you have insufficient
demand relative to productive capacity. With
nominal GDP well above productive capacity,
there is sufficient aggregate demand. Currently,
even though the recovery has been sluggish,
nominal spending has grown 3.8 percent in the
last year, the Fed is pursuing a monetary policy
that is easy by any measure, and the U.S. dollar is
falling. The probability of a persistent decline in
the general price level is very, very low. If defla-
tion were to occur, would it be destabilizing? Not
necessarily. The prices of many goods are falling
because of positive supply shocks and technolog-
ical innovation, while the prices of services are
rising at a 3 percent pace. That’s not destabiliz-
ing. In this regard, history is instructive. Certainly,
the Great Depression was associated with defla-
tion, but falling prices were a symptom of other
problems. Other episodes of mild deflation have
been associated with strong growth. As for the
third issue, Japan has had trouble getting out of
deflation, in large part because of the Bank of
Japan’s misguided policies and the dysfunctional
banking system that has muddled the channels
through which monetary policy affects aggregate
demand. But in the United States, monetary policy
is accommodative and the banking system is very
solid and very well-capitalized. The zero nominal
bound on interest rates would not inhibit required
monetary easing. So there are big differences that
would permit the United States to deal with the
problem much more successfully than Japan.
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Europe’s lackluster
economic performance,
especially in the core of
Europe, has little to do
with the ECB and
much to do with the
excessive scope of gov-
ernment, anti-growth
taxes, and burdensome
regulatory policies.RF: The state of monetary policy has changed
dramatically since Allan Meltzer and Karl
Brunner founded the SOMC in 1973. How
does that change the job of the SOMC and the
focus of its meetings?
Levy: Let’s consider two major changes since the
SOMC was founded. First, inflation has fallen
dramatically from its high levels in the 1970s to
close to zero. Second, in sharp contrast to 1973,
virtually everybody now agrees that in the long
run inflation is a monetary phenomenon. The
SOMC was founded because Meltzer, Brunner,
Anna Schwartz, and other early members were
frustrated that policymakers didn’t really under-
stand what drove inflation. 
Now, with low inflation, the focus of the
SOMC has changed. In many ways, our focus has
broadened to cover many issues beyond monetary
policy. We discuss fiscal policy, trade policy, and a
whole host of headline issues where the public
debate is misguided. When I joined the SOMC
in 1983, I focused on fiscal policy, and now I also
contribute to the committee’s thinking about the
economic forecast and monetary policy. Perhaps
the SOMC’s role has been diluted because the Fed
has followed largely the right prescriptions and
the battle against inflation has been temporarily
won. That’s a big plus for economic performance,
but there are still important issues. 
Consider the issue of inflation targeting and
the ongoing debate between rules versus discre-
tion. I believe Alan Greenspan has been an out-
standing Chairman—the best ever—but you have
to ask: What happens next? Will the next mone-
tary regime have the same skills and luck? I think
now is the time to make institutional changes and
establish guidelines, so that the recent success is
not transitory. I strongly favor inflation targeting.
RF: Much of your early work focused on the
economic effects of the initiative process,
specifically tax and spending limitations. We
are approaching the 25th anniversary of Propo-
sition 13 in California, which limited property
taxes in that state. Looking back, would you
judge it to be a success? And, more generally,
has the initiative process lived up to its promise
and moved policy in a positive direction?
Levy: In the 1970s, inflation was rising, pushing
people into higher tax brackets, and the state’s tax
receipts were soaring. That led to a ballot initia-
tive in California to limit both taxes and expendi-
tures. It failed but on the rebound an initiative to
cap property taxes, Proposition 13, was enacted. It
may have contributed marginally to keeping a lid
on the scope of government. But it wasn’t really a
well-conceived law and it created unintended dis-
tortions. For instance, by limiting property taxes,
Proposition 13 drove up property values and led to
increases in other taxes. In contrast, the tax-and-
expenditure limitation, though very simple, would
have been much more successful in
rationalizing government spending
programs and would have avoided
many of the unintended distortions.
Fiscal policy on the state level
now is extremely disappointing. In
the 1990s, when the economy was
expanding more rapidly than its
long-run trendline and tax receipts
were accelerating sharply, federal
policymakers generally held the line
on spending, but many state and
local elected officials viewed the
higher tax receipts as an opportu-
nity to put in place very expensive
programs. Since then, tax receipts
have fallen dramatically, and now
the states are running big deficits.
To a large extent, this reflects fiscal
mismanagement. What happens
now? I’m very concerned that some
portion of the deficits at the state
and local levels will be closed by tax
increases. Those increases could be
sizable and could offset the stimu-
lus provided by the federal tax cuts,
while at the same time validating
those costly new spending initia-
tives. The economy’s long-run
potential growth may eventually be
constrained by the sharp rise in
defense spending and the rise in
taxes at the state and local level,
which involve more government
absorption of national resources that will crowd
out private consumption and investment.
RF: Which economists have influenced you
the most?
Levy: I have been fortunate to have worked with
and learned from a number of economic scholars.
Of course, Allan Meltzer has been a guiding light
for me ever since I joined the SOMC. Other past
and present SOMC members, like Bill Poole, cur-
rently the St. Louis Fed President, have made
strong impressions. Bill Niskanen has been very
influential. And I must add a non-economist to
this list: the late political scientist Aaron Wil-
davsky, who was Dean of the Graduate School of
Public Policy at Berkeley. RF
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